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The Gender Wage Gap in the Economics Profession
A Search in the Return to Marriage and Fertility of Ph.D. Economists

Weiyi Shi
Agnes Scott College
December 1, 1999

Abstract:
Previous researchers have found that after controlling for various determinants of
economists’ earnings, there still remains an unexplained residual wage gap across
genders in the economics profession. This study uses 1990 Census data to examine the
return to marriage and fertility of male and female Ph.D. economists in an attempt to
explain in part the residual gender wage gap in the profession. Marital status is found to
have no impact on male or female economists’ earnings. Fertility does not affect male
economists' earnings, but is negatively correlated with female economists' earnings. I
conclude that the different returns to fertility across genders may account for part of the
residual gender wage gap in the economics profession that is unexplained by previous
studies.

I.

Introduction.
It is well known that there exists a sizable gender wage gap in the economics

profession. Previous literature has examined various determinants of economists'
earnings such as prestige of one's graduate institution, volume and quality of one's
publications, first job placement, etc. Despite controlling for those factors, there remains
an unexplained gender wage differential. However, the impact of marriage and family
lives on male and female economists’ earnings is less explored. Using 1990 Census data,
this paper examines the returns to marriage and fertility among male and female
economists and finds that martial status has no impact on male or female economists'
earnings. Returns to fertility, however, are found to be significantly different across
genders, and female economists’ earnings are negatively correlated with the number of
children born to them. Hence, fertility may partially account for the residual earnings gap
in the economics profession.

II.

Review of Literature.
Previous studies have consistently found that female economists earn less than

their male counterparts (Johnson and Stafford, 1974, McDowell and Smith, 1992, Broder,
1993). In a sample of 392 academic economists, Broder (1993) found that the mean
salary for male economists was $64,288 in 1989 dollars, while the mean salary for their
female counterparts was only $42,302 in 1989 dollars. This gender wage gap appears to
have narrowed since 1960s but still remains (Barbezat, 1991).
In an attempt to explain why such a large gender wage gap exists in the
profession, researchers have examined whether women are at a disadvantage in various
1
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determinants of economists’ earnings. Regardless of gender, studies have uniformly
found that economists’ earnings are positively correlated with the rank of the Ph.D.
granting department, volume and quality of publications, age and seniority, and the
quality of first job placement, ceteris paribus. The academic labor market appears to
only allow economists to go to lower ranked institutions after their first jobs (Rutman and
Stevenson, 1979), suggesting the supreme importance of one’s first job placement.
As to first job placement, results are mixed. Formby, Gunther, and Sakano (1993)
find gender makes no significant difference, while McMillen and Singell (1994) conclude
that women face inferior opportunities because of systematic job mismatch.
Admission to Ph.D. programs is found to be a fairly equal game for men and
women in the economics profession. Attiyeh and Attiyeh (1993) find that admission does
not discriminate against women and instead female applicants actually have a 4
percentage higher probability of being admitted to an economics Ph.D. program, possibly
due to affirmative action. Kahn (1995) finds that in 1993 the fraction of doctorate degrees
awarded to women at top-tier economics departments is the same as at all economics
departments, implying that women are as likely to have graduated from a top tier
program as men when entering the job market. “A similar count for 1985 and 1986 also
found that the percentage female among Ph.D. recipients at the top seven schools was
within one-half percentage point of the percentage female among all economics Ph.D.
awarded during those years." (Kahn, 1995) The above evidence suggests that, at least in
recent years, Ph.D. granting department rank is not a factor that has suppressed female
economists' earnings.

2
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The volume and quality of publications, however, differ across genders. On
average, women publish less than men and publish less in esteemed journals, even after
controlling for experience (Broder, 1993; McDowell and Smith, 1992). The consensus of
prior research is that publication differentials offer a partial explanation for why women
earn less than men.
Finally, age and seniority may play a role in explaining the wage gap. It was not
until early 1970s that women increasingly earned doctorate degrees in various disciplines
(Ferber and Loeb, 1997). In economics, only 6.2% of the Ph.D degrees were granted to
women in 1970, 15% in 1984/1985 (Broder, 1993), while in 1993 the number surged to
22.8% (Kahn, 1995). Women are relatively new to the economics profession and hence
they have less seniority.
After controlling for Ph.D. granting department rank, publications, first job
placement, and age and seniority, the gender wage gap in the economics profession still
cannot be fully explained. The residual signals either discrimination or some uncaptured
performance-related variable (Kahn, 1995). Discrimination is a popular hypothesis in
earlier literature. According to a study by Johnson and Stafford (1974) on female faculty
in the disciplines of economics, sociology, mathematics, biology, and physics in 1974,
roughly three-fifths of the female wage and promotion disadvantage may be attributed to
discrimination. Over time, however, discrimination has become less and less
pronounced. The discrimination hypothesis may still hold for older cohorts, but is no
longer significant for younger cohorts. Using Oaxaca’s methodology, Broder (1993) finds
no significant gender coefficients consistent with the discrimination hypothesis in a
sample of assistant economics professors.
3
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An obvious deficiency of previous research is the lack of empirical testing of the
relationship between marriage and fertility variables and economists’ earnings.
Nevertheless, the importance of marriage and fertility variables is non-negligible in the
study of the gender wage gap in the profession. Johnson and Stafford (1974), along with
Gordon and Morton (1974), have offered hypotheses as to why marriage and fertility may
underlie the persistent gender wage differentials. Johnson and Stafford (1974) recall from
the life cycle models of training that those who expect disruptions in their labor force
participation will invest less in human capital, resulting in a lower prospect of earning
growth. In the case of Ph.D. female economists, who may expect their marriage and
fertility to affect their labor force participation, their disrupted earning curves are
reflected in the fact that the gender wage gap first widens and then narrows in one’s life
cycle. This is referred to as the “catch-up effect” that takes place once female economists
get beyond child-bearing years. However, Johnson and Stafford (1974) did not provide
direct empirical evidence on the relationship between fertility and female economists’
earnings.
Gordon and Morton (1974) argue that women have a steeper labor supply curve
than men, because they are relatively immobile, given their preference and necessity to
stay geographically close to their husbands and children. Marriage and fertility, leading to
a lack of mobility, has suppressed women’s earnings. Reagan (1975) indicated a steeper
labor supply curve for female economists than for their male counterparts, but offered no
empirical testing on the association between marriage, fertility, and earnings.
Partly, the lack of incorporation of marriage and fertility data into empirical
analysis is due to the absence of family related information in both National Science
4

http://GLJLWDOFRPPRQVLZXHGXXDXMH

Foundation Survey of Earned Doctorates and the American Economic Association
Member Survey, which are two standard data sets used by existing research. A notable
exception is Kahn (1995), who found that marriage and the presence of children have no
impact on female economists’ earnings; the same test given to men also generated
insignificant coefficients.
Using 1990 Census data, this paper searches for the potential different impact of
marriage and fertility on earnings across genders, which may, in turn, contribute in part to
the gender wage gap. Statistically insignificant results, conversely, suggest that marriage
and fertility do not underlie the wage gap. In the following parts of the paper, I will
explain some technicalities of the 1990 Census data, interpret descriptive statistics,
introduce empirical methodologies and report regression results, and then conclude the
paper by summarizing the limitations of this paper and pointing out directions for further
research.

III.

The Data
This paper uses the 5% public use microdata samples of the 1990 Census of

Population and Housing. The data includes variables that comprehensively define a
person’s characteristics such as type of residence area, education, income, occupation,
marital status, and other demographic features. The choice of the 1990 Census data set
distinguishes this paper from the previous literature. Previous studies of academic labor
markets for economists have traditionally used either NSF Survey of Earned Doctorates
data or AEA member survey data, neither of which asks family-related questions. In the
1990 Census, however, detailed marital and fertility information are included for women
5
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and marital information for men, which makes it possible to add variables concerning
marriage and fertility to earning equations.
Although a measure of men’s fertility is not readily available in the data set, I
derived fertility information for men by matching husbands and wives within a state
using household serial number and the family relation variable and then transferring the
wives’ fertility data to the husbands. By using this method of derivation, I am making the
assumption that all children ever born to the wives are also their current husbands’
children. Fertility information for single, widowed, and divorced or separated men is still
unattainable by this method. Given the data set, this is a fairly good approximation to
men’s true fertility, as married men constitute the majority of male Ph.D. economists. As
household serial number is only uniquely valid within a state, I cannot match couples that
live in different states. Hence in the following analysis that involves fertility, I have
excluded the observations of married men for whom I cannot find their matching wives.
I include only records of Ph.D. economists in my final sample. For an observation
to qualify as a Ph.D. economist, education attainment must be indicated as “doctorate
degree;” occupation must be indicated either as “post-secondary economics teacher” or
“economist.” The final sample consists of 558 Ph.D. economists. 461 are male and 97 are
female.
The limitation of the Census data is that it does not include variables that are
unique and crucial to the analysis of labor markets for economists such as rank of
department, prestige of the institution, and publications. Additionally, as the public use
Census data files sample 5% of the U.S. population, the sample size for Ph.D.
economists turned out to be small.
6

http://GLJLWDOFRPPRQVLZXHGXXDXMH

IV.

Descriptive Statistics
In the sample, male economists are found to earn significantly more on average

than their female counterparts. The mean wage or salary-based income for men is
$55,944.35, whereas for women it is $44,527.72, generating a mean wage differential of
$11,416.63. Table 1 shows that the difference is statistically significant on 5% level,
according to the Welch’s test for two group means without assuming equal group
variances. One has to be careful, however, in interpreting this differential, because female
Ph.D.s are on average younger than their male counterparts and therefore have less
seniority.
Men and women also display different distributions of marital status (Table 2).
Among the 461 men, 379 are married, 35 divorced or separated, 42 single, and 5
widowed. Among the 97 women, however, 62 are married, 14 divorced or separated, 19
single, and 2 widowed. It appears that female Ph.D. economists are less likely to be
married and more likely to be divorced or separated. In comparison to earlier literature in
the 1970s, this difference persists over time. Strober (1975) found in a sample of 678
women Ph.D. economists that 26 percent of them are single while12 percent are divorced
or separated. However in the matching sample for men, only 12 percent are single and 6
percent divorced or separated.
Interestingly, wage incomes across marital statuses also display different patterns
across gender groups (Table 2). I disregard widowed economists in this comparison
because there are few of them and the determinants of their incomes are rather complex.
After disregarding widowed women, divorced or separated women earn the highest
incomes, followed by single women, and finally married women. Divorced women
7
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heading the list contradicts the general observation that divorced women tend to belong
to less privileged groups (Arendell, 1986). In contrast, disregarding widowed men,
married men earn the most, followed by divorced or separated men, and then single men.
This appears to be consistent with the widely accepted observation that men experience a
marriage premium in labor markets (Korenman and Neumark, 1991). It is notable that
although single women are on average younger than single men in the sample, they earn
significantly higher wages. This observation makes one suspect that marriage is
negatively correlated with female economists’ earnings but positively correlated with
male economists’ earnings.
Men and women also differ with respect to fertility. Among the 78 once or
currently married women in the sample, 44 percent had yet to have a first birth at a mean
age of 37.86. About 84 percent have fewer than two children. This appears to be simply a
more extreme case than Goldin’s (1995) finding that in a cohort of college educated
white women, 28 percent were childless at ages between 37 and 47 in 1991. Table 3
shows that as the number of children increases, the mean income of the group decreases
rapidly, despite the older mean group age. This observation signals the possibility that
fertility may be negatively correlated with women economists’ earnings. Because of the
limitation of the data, only fertility of married men is available for comparison. Among
the married men, only 16 percent have no children and 66 percent have at least two
children. As the number of children increases, men’s incomes first increase and then
decrease, suggesting a different pattern from that of women.

8
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V.

Regression Analysis.
In the final sample for regression, observations for widowed economists are

excluded because of the multiple and arbitrary determinants of their incomes. Also
excluded are observations of economists with zero incomes and those married men whose
matching wives’ records cannot be found.

To set up the functional form of the earning equations, I consider sex, marital
status, and fertility, in addition to one’s location of residence, race, citizenship, hours
worked per week in 1989, sector in which one works, and seniority in the profession.
Location of residence is taken into consideration because costs of living tend to be higher
in metropolitan areas and hence the expectation is that residence within metropolitan
areas is positively correlated with earnings. I differentiate between Ph.D. economists in
the academic sector and the non-academic sector with the expectation that non-academic
economists tend to earn more than their academic counterparts. Either a positive or a
negative coefficient can be expected from the number of hours worked per week, since
one may either argue that lower salary earners have to work harder to advance in their
careers, or that economists who work more result in higher earnings. As to seniority, the
concave-down curve of one’s life-cycle earning is captured by two variables, AGE and
AGE 2 . A positive coefficient is expected from AGE and a negative one from AGE 2 .
Table 4 presents the variables included in the final regression, their definitions,
and summary statistics. I use Ordinary Least Square linear regression method to estimate
the following earning equations:
Equation (1):
9
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Ln( INCOME ) = β 0 + β 1 METRO + β 2 RACEWHITE + β 3 AGE + β 4 AGE 2 + β 5 MARRIED
+ β 6 DIVORCED + β 7 FERTILITY + β 8 CITIZEN + β 9 ACADEMIC + β 10WEEKHOUR89
+ε
Equation (2):
Ln( INCOME ) = β 0 + β 1 METRO + β 2 RACEWHITE + β 3 AGE + β 4 AGE 2 + β 5 SEX ∗ AGE
+ β 6 SEX ∗ AGE 2 + β 7 MARRIED + β 8 DIVORCED + β 9 SEX ∗ MARRIED
+ β 10 SEX ∗ DIVORCED + β 11 FERTILITY + β 12 SEX ∗ FERTILITY + β 13 CITIZEN
+ β 14 ACADEMIC + β 15WEEKHOUR89 + β 16 SEX + ε

Equation (2) includes several interaction terms of sex and marital status, sex and
fertility, as well as sex and seniority. A statistically significant coefficient associated
with the SEX *FERTILITY interaction term will indicate that the correlation between
fertility and men’s earnings is statistically significantly different from that between
fertility and women’s earnings. A positive coefficient indicates that such correlation is
strengthened in the case of women while a negative coefficient indicates a reduction of
the correlation. Similar rules of interpretation can be applied to the interaction of sex and
marital status and the interaction of age and seniority. If one suspects women experience
lower returns to marriage and fertility than men, then the critical expectations will be that
the coefficients of both SEX*MARRIED and SEX* FERTILITY are negative.
Equation (1) is estimated separately for men and women and the results are shown
in comparison to each other in Table 5. Equation (2) is estimated for the entire sample.
These results are presented in Table 6.
As expected, the estimated coefficients of Equation (1) indicate that number of
children is negatively correlated with female income, with the result significant at a 5%
10
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level. These results contradict those found by Kahn (1995) that the presence of children
does not lead women academic economists to publish less or slow their tenure process.
Results from Equation (1) also indicate that fertility is not statistically significantly
correlated with male economists’ earnings with a t value of 1.601. This is consistent with
Kahn’s (1995) finding that presence of children has no significant association with male
publication and tenure rates (t=1.75). The difference between the fertility coefficients for
men and women signals that there may exist different returns to fertility across gender
groups.
The marriage variable is found to have no correlation with either female or male
economists’ earnings. For women, Kahn (1995) also found that marriage does not have
significant impact on female economists’ performance. This is consistent with the finding
in the general population that there is no significant correlation between marriage and
female labor market productivity (Korenman and Neumark, 1989). For men,
interestingly, male economists do not experience the male marriage premium that exists
in the general population. Marriage is of no statistical significance to their earnings.
Although divorce has not been examined by any of the previous studies on the labor
market for economists, my results suggest that divorce has no statistically significant
impact on either female or male economists’ earnings.
The coefficients of AGE and AGE2 have their expected signs and are significant at
1% level for men but are not statistically significant for women. This result suggests the
possibility that in the economics profession, men’s earnings rise more rapidly but also
level off substantially as they become old. Women may take longer to raise their earnings

11
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and the leveling-off is also more gradual. This is consistent with the fact that the gender
wage gap in the profession first widens and later converges (Johnson and Stafford, 1974).
This convergence is referred to by Johnson and Stafford (1974) as the “catch-up”
effect women economists experience once they get beyond their child-bearing years.
Johnson and Stafford (1974) believe that this catch up effect can be captured by the
negative coefficient of SEX ∗ AGE and the positive coefficient of SEX ∗ AGE 2 . My
results for Equation (2), however, do not indicate statistically significant coefficients for
these two interaction terms. One possible explanation is that women in the late 1980s
postponed marriage and child-bearing. If child-bearing is to negatively affect their
earnings, the effect of a late birth will not be as negative because it could be partly
remedied by the seniority the older women have already gained. A late birth also makes
the “catch-up’ effect less obvious because there will not be much time left for them to
speed up after a late birth. Rather than totally contradict the earlier results, my results
may suggest a social trend of women delaying marriage and births in recent decades,
especially for highly educated women.
Complementing Johnson and Stafford’s (1994) indirect and suggestive approach,
the availability of fertility data allows this study to examine directly the relationship
between fertility and earnings. In the estimation of Equation (2), there is a negative
coefficient for the interaction of SEX and FERTILITY that is statistically significant at a
5% level. This is consistent with the finding in the estimation of Equation (1) that men
and women have different estimated coefficients for the fertility variable. The negative
coefficient of the SEX and FERTILITY interaction conclusively indicates that female
economists experience statistically significantly lower return to fertility. As a matter of
12
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fact, from the estimation of Equation (1) we know this return is negative. The gender
difference with regard to fertility offers a partial explanation why gender wage gap
persists in the economics profession.
Contrary to our expectation, the interaction of SEX and MARRIED and the
interaction of SEX and DIVORCED do not generate significant coefficients, suggesting
that male and female economists do not experience different returns to marriage or
divorce. Hence, marital status may not account for the residual gender earning gap in the
economics profession.

VI.

Conclusion.
In an attempt to shed light on the gender wage gap residual in the economics

profession, this paper examines the returns to marriages and fertility of men and women
economists. The results suggest that neither marriage nor divorce has a statistically
significant impact on women or men economists’ earnings. Therefore, marital status does
not account for the gender wage gap residual that was not explained in the previous
literature. Fertility, or the number of children, however, is found to have a negative return
among female economists but does not affect their male counterparts’ earnings. One can
hence conclude that the different returns to fertility of male and female Ph.D. economists
may account partly for the residual gender wage gap in the economics profession.
However, further study is needed. This paper is limited by a small sample size and
the use of approximate and incomplete data for male economists’ fertility. Additionally,
because of the restriction of the 1990 Census data, crucial variables such as rank of the
departments and publications are not included in the analysis.
13
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The ultimate goal of studying residual gender wage gap is to test whether
discrimination still exists in the profession. Readers should be aware that though fertility
is found to account for part of the residual wage gap, the part it accounts for is not
necessarily free of discrimination. It is possible that child-bearing may exogenously
reduce women’s productivity, or less productive women to have more kids because of the
lower opportunity cost, but it is also possible that pregnant women and women with
children are simply discriminated against. Why residual gender wage gap persists, either
because of discrimination or other unobserved performance-related variables, remains
inconclusive. In further research, more sophisticated empirical methods will be needed to
test the presence of discrimination in the economics profession.

14
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Table 1. Two-sample t test with unequal variances
Men: Number of obs = 461
Women: Number of obs = 97
_________Mean
Std. Err.
t
P>|t|
Men
55944.35 1786.457 31.3158 0.0000
Women 44527.72 3163.087 14.0773 0.0000
Diff
11416.63 3632.705 3.14274 0.0020

95% Conf. Interval
52433.72 59454.98
38249.04 50806.4
4244.016 18589.24

Welch's degrees of freedom: 164.88937
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Table 2

Married
Divorced or
separated
Single
Widowed
All

Women
Men
number of
percentage of mean
mean number of
percentage of mean
mean age
observations the total
income
age
observations the total
income
62
64% $40,675.98 40.03
379
82% $ 57,830.20
47.22
14
14% $64,447.28 41.57
35
8% $ 55,522.11
46.8
19
2
97

20%
2%
100%

$44,158.74
$28,000.00
$44,527.70

34.36
38.5
39.11

42
5
461

9% $ 39,820.02
1% $ 51,396.80
100% $ 55,944.35

37.76
56.6
46.43

Married/ divorced or separated/ widowed women's
Married men's fertility (N=369)
fertility (N=78)
Number of Percentage
Mean
Mean age
Number of Percentage
Mean
Mean age
observations of the total
income
observations of the total
income
No child
59
16% $49,002.93
45.10
34
44% $55,378.14
37.86
One child
66
18% $54,601.43
43.15
12
15% $53,939.50
38.58
Two children
142
38% $63,280.34
46.49
20
26% $31,095.85
42.3
Three children
65
18% $60,751.75
50.66
3
4% $30,041.67
44
More than three
37
10% $49,900.73
56.59
9
12% $26,444.45
45.89
children
Table 3
Fertility

18
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Table 4. Summary of variables in the final regression.
Variable
INCOME
SEX
METRO
RACEWHITE
AGE
MARRIED
DIVORCED
FERTILITY
CITIZEN

ACADEMIC
WORKHOUR89

Definition
Wages or salary income in 1989 (140001 or
more=state median of topcode values)
0=male; 1=female
0=residence not within metropolitan areas;
1=residence within metropolitan areas.
0=non-whites; 1=whites
age in years
0=not married; 1=married
0=not divorced or separated; 1=divorced or
separated
0=missing; 1-11=number of children plus one
0=not citizen of the U.S.; 1= U.S. citizen by
naturalization; 2=Born in the U.S., or Puerto
Rico, Guam, and outlying areas, or born
abroad of American parents
0=Non-academic economist; 1=academic
economist
usual hours worked per week in 1989 (99=99
or more usual hours)

Female economists (N=90)
Male economists (N=409)
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Mean
Std. Dev. Min Max
47368.77 30349.89 2400 195516
60862.5 36097.99 563 195875
1
0
0.966667 0.1805111

1
0

1
0
0
1 0.9633252 0.1881924

0
0

0
1

0.9 0.3016807
38.7 7.494492
0.644444 0.481363
0.155556 0.3644639

0
23
0
0

1 0.8679707 0.3389373
58 45.62347 10.0235
1 0.8264059 0.379224
1 0.0806846 0.2726837

0
21
0
0

1
78
1
1

1.888889

1.275917

1

6

2.418093 1.646078

0

11

1.655556 0.7214391

0

2

1.567237 0.7707918

0

2

0.188889 0.3936132

0

1 0.1711491 0.3771005

0

1

44.12222

8

8

99

10.8419
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99

45.33496 10.03463

Table 5. OLS Regression of Equation (1)

Variable
METRO
RACEWHTE
AGE
AGE 2
MARRIED
DIVORCED
CITIZEN
ACADEMIC
FERTILITY
WORKHOUR89
Constant
Adjusted R squared
N

men
Coef.
0.4702
0.0294
0.1669
-0.0018
0.9765
0.1968
-0.0392
-0.1137
0.5425
0.1479
6.2468
0.1649
409

t
2.22
0.229
5.634
-6.106
0.572
0.986
-0.691
-1.049
1.601
3.673
8.965

women
Coef.
0.1163
0.2324
0.0925
-0.0010
0.2651
0.3190
-0.0216
-0.2332
-0.1305
0.0316
6.8297
0.3200
90

t
0.357
1.055
1.311
-1.138
1.468
1.432
-0.237
-1.546
-2.382
5.499
4.922

Table 6. OLS Regression of Equation (2)
Variable
METRO
RACEWHITE
AGE
AGE 2
SEX*AGE
SEX* AGE 2
MARRIED
DIVORCED
SEX*MARRIED
SEX*DIVORCED
FERTILITY
SEX*FERTILITY
CITIZEN
ACADEMIC
WORKHOUR89
SEX
Constant
Adjusted R squared
N

Coef.
.4041
.0308
.1643
-.0018

t
2.193
.337
5.882
-6.302

-.0572
.0007

-0.565
0.532

.0891
.1836
.0760
.0723
.0530
-.1918
-.0379
-.1431
.0178
1.342
6.128
.1821
499

0.548
0.964
0.261
0.202
1.640
-2.371
-0.731
-1.547
5.197
0.682
9.253
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